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Abstract
A compositional theory of perceptual representations would explain how the accuracy con-
ditions of a given type of perceptual state depend on the contents of constituent perceptual
representations and the way those constituents are structurally related. Such a theory would
offer a basic framework for understanding the nature, grounds, and epistemic significance of
perception. But an adequate semantics of perceptual representations must accommodate the
holistic nature of perception. In particular, perception is replete with context effects, in which
the way one perceptually represents one aspect of a scene (including the position, size, orienta-
tion, shape, color, motion, or even unity of an object) normally depends on how one represents
many other aspects of the scene. The ability of existing accounts of the semantics of percep-
tion to analyze context effects is at best unclear. Context effects have even been thought to
call into question the very feasibility of a systematic semantics of perception. After outlining
a compositional semantics for a rudimentary set of percepts, I draw on empirical models from
perceptual psychology to show how such a theory must be modified to analyze context effects.
Context effects arise from substantive constraints on how perceptual representations can com-
bine and from the different semantic roles that perceptual representations can have. I suggest
that context effects are closely tied to the objectivity of perception. They arise from a percep-
tual grammar that functions to facilitate the composition of reliably accurate representations in
an uncertain but structured world.
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1 Introduction
Mental states such as beliefs, desires, memories, and perceptions are representational. The visual
state I am in when I see the tabletop in front of me represents that tabletop as a yellow rectangular
surface and is accurate insofar as that surface is yellow and rectangular. Mental representations can
be structured too; they can have constituent parts. The visual state that I am in has as constituents
my representation of the yellowness of the tabletop and my representation of its rectangularity,
which in turn has as constituents my representation of the sides and corners of the tabletop (Lande,
2021). A systematic semantic theory of mental representations would articulate the principles by
which a representation’s content relates to its structure. In particular, a compositional semantics of
mental representations would explain the way a mental state represents the world as a function of
the way its constituent parts represent the world and how those parts are structurally related. Rather
than simply asking about what a given type of mental state represents—for example, whether
some perceptual states represent certain kinds of shape properties, whether some perceptual states
represent cause, and so on—such a theory asks about how the contents of mental states fit together
within a broader representational system.
Many of the attempts to outline a systematic semantics of mental representations have focused
on aspects of cognition and thought (Fodor, 1975, Devitt, 2006, Camp, 2007, Rescorla, 2009).
Yet a growing consensus holds that accounts of the nature of mental representation and of its
place in nature must be grounded in an adequate account of perceptual representation (Burge,
2010, Neander, 2017). Perception is arguably the most basic species of mental representation,
or intentionality. A semantics of perceptual representations would offer a basic framework for
understanding the nature, grounds, and epistemic significance of perception. The aim of this paper
is to make progress toward an adequate compositional semantics of perception.
Discussions of the semantics of perception typically focus on simple core cases. For example,
as I look at the tabletop, plausibly I see its surface as rectangular, yellow, and on the right, rather
than round, blue, and on the left, solely in virtue of the facts that my visual representation of the
surface is made up of a representation of its rectangular shape, a representation of its yellow color,
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and a representation of its location, and that these representations are “integrated” together. When
I see a round blue tabletop next to the rectangular yellow tabletop, my representations of these
items are in some sense concatenated together as constituents of my total percept. Some charac-
terize these “integration” and “concatenation” operations on the model of conjunction, whether of
predicates or of formulas (Sober, 1976, Clark, 2004, Matthen, 2005, Tacca, 2011), while others
analogize them to the juxtaposition of marks in an image or map (Fodor, 2008, Kulvicki, 2015,
Quilty-Dunn, 2019). On either conception the standard attitude seems to be that the “grammar”
of vision—its combinatorial principles and their semantic import—is fairly rudimentary and, as
Fodor (2008, p. 175) put it, “unarcane.”
We can distill from these views two common assumptions about the compositional structure
of perception. First, semantic uniformity: a constituent representation of the feature of one part of
the scene (for example, the yellowness of the tabletop) has the same semantic role as a constituent
representation of any other feature of any other part of the scene (the rectangularity of the tabletop;
the blueness of the nearby tabletop). Any such representation can be evaluated on its own as veridi-
cal or not with respect to the object being represented. Each determines a “complete” veridicality
condition (for example, that the represented item be yellow). Second, unrestricted combination:
these constituents can in principle be combined without substantive constraints. In principle, the
representation of the tabletop’s yellowness could just as easily have combined with a representation
roundness as with a representation of rectangularity, and a representation of a rectangular yellow
tabletop could just as easily combine with a representation of an adjacent round blue tabletop as
with a representation of an adjacent black stool. These two assumptions leave open questions about
what primitive parts populate one’s “perceptual dictionary” and what principles of computation or
“inference” govern the formation and use of these parts and their combinations. But even setting
these questions to the side, the compositional grammar of perception is unlikely to be as simple as
the simple cases suggest.
The Gestalt psychologists of the early 20th century—Kurt Koffka, Max Wertheimer, and Wolf-
gang Köhler among them—insisted that perception is profoundly holistic. The central mark of the
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holistic character of perception is the ubiquity of perceptual context effects, in which the way one
perceives one aspect of a scene varies in relation to the way one perceives other aspects of the
scene. For example, the headlights of two motorcycles traveling side by side appear to belong to
separate objects during the daytime when the outlines of the motorcycles and the pavement be-
tween them are visible. The same pair of lights appear to belong to a single object in the nighttime
when these other parts of the scene are invisible. Likewise, the perceived tilt of the floor influences
how one perceives the orientation of a picture frame hanging on the wall above. In fact, almost no
perceptual phenomena are in principle immune to context effects. How one perceives orientation,
size, shape, color, location, motion, unity, and just about any other feature of an object normally
depends on how one perceives many other aspects of the scene. Context effects are so pervasive in
perception that one can reasonably infer that they are central to its successful functioning.
At best, the ubiquity of context effects calls into question the explanatory power and general-
ity of accounts that focus on cases in which these effects are elided. The Gestalt school targeted
the empiricist theories of psychological “structuralists,” like Edward Titchener, who held that per-
cepts consist of independent elements that can be associated and combined without restriction.
Wertheimer (1938) wrote that the perceived features in a scene are not “pieces to be combined in
and-summations.” Some today take the ubiquity of perceptual context effects to call into question
the very feasibility of a compositional semantics of perception. For example, Camp writes that “it
is not obvious that a [compositional] semantics can be offered for pictures, let alone perception. In
particular, the representational significance of images often appears to be highly local and context-
dependent: changes to the marks which make little semantic difference at one location produce
significant semantic difference, or destroy the representation altogether, at another” (Camp, 2018,
p. 42, my emphasis; see also Cummins, 1996, Balog, 2009). It is natural to wonder whether the
project of compositional analysis is fundamentally in tension with the holistic nature of perception.
Focusing on vision, I argue that sophisticated compositional theories can handle characteris-
tically holistic phenomena in perception and illuminate the underlying principles that drive them.
I begin, in Section 2, by discussing the explanatory value of a semantics of perception. I sketch
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a basic semantics for a rudimentary set of percepts, exemplifying the assumptions that the con-
stituents of perceptual representations are semantically uniform and freely combinable. In Section
3, I introduce several classic context effects, which the basic theory as it stands cannot explain. In
Section 4, I draw on models in perceptual psychology to develop compositional analyses of these
phenomena. These analyses abandon the assumptions of semantic uniformity and unrestricted
combination. Context effects arise from substantive constraints on the combination of percep-
tual representations and from the integration of representations with different semantic roles. In
Section 5, I suggest that context effects are closely tied to the objectivity of perception. Context
effects function to facilitate the composition of accurate perceptual representations in an uncertain
but structured environment. I conclude in Section 6 by discussing the prospects of a semantics of
perception.
2 Semantics for Perception
I assume a realist attitude toward semantic theories of mental representations. The value of having
a systematic semantics of perception is not just in having a compact way of describing a range of
different perceptual states. Mental representations really have content and they really have con-
stituent structure. An adequate semantics of perception must explain how semantic relationships
between perceptual states correspond to structural relationships between those states. In this sec-
tion, I discuss how such a theory would provide a basic framework for addressing questions about
the nature, grounds, and epistemic potential of perceptual content. I then sketch a basic semantics
for a simplified set of percepts. In the next sections, I will examine how this basic semantics needs
to be revised in order to accommodate characteristic perceptual phenomena.
2.1 Compositionality as a Theoretical Framework
I will proceed on the working hypothesis that a systematic semantics of perceptual representations
will be compositional. A representational system is semantically compositional if and only if the
content of every representation in the system is functionally determined solely by the way that
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representation is structured from its constituents and by the contents of those constituents.1 A
compositional semantic theory identifies the structural principles by which representations can
combine and the semantic principles by which the representations with a given structure derive
their contents from the contents of their constituents. Truth-functional logic, in which the truth
value of every well-formed compound formula or sub-formula is wholly a function of the truth
values of its constituents and their mode of combination, is paradigmatically compositional.
Consider the visual state one is in when viewing these three line segments:
— | {
One’s visual state represents the stimulus in a certain way. A compositional analysis of this percep-
tual representation must specify the structure of one’s representation of the stimulus. For example:
the representation of this scene may have as constituents a representation as of the horizontal line
on the left, a representation as of the vertical line in the center, and a representation as of the tilted
line on the right. The theory must also specify the semantic import of having a set of constituents
under the relevant mode of combination. For example: as a rule this sort of combination is veridi-
cal just in case all its constituents are veridical. The analysis entails, plausibly enough, that one’s
perceptual representation (or “percept”) of the stimulus is veridical if and only if the line on the
left is horizontal, the one in the middle is vertical, and the one on the right is tilted right.
The central explanatory value of compositional semantic theories lies in their potential to iden-
tify and explain systematic relationships between the contents of different representations (Fodor
and Pylyshyn, 1988). Consider one’s perceptual representation of the following display:
— z |
How one perceives this arrangement is related to how one perceives the previous one. In both
cases, one’s percept is veridical only if the line on the left is horizontal. An explanation of this
commonality is that both representations have a common constituent that represents a horizon-
tal line on the left. When the constituent figures into a more complex representation, that latter
1Though there are various ways to define compositionality more precisely, this formulation will do for our purposes.
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representation will be veridical only if there is a horizontal line on the left—assuming that as a
rule complex perceptual representations of this form are veridical just in case their constituents
are. There is therefore an underlying semantic explanation of why the percepts of the two stimuli
above have related veridicality conditions.
Compositional theories can help to identify in the first place which relationships between con-
tents are systematic and which are merely incidental. For example, the percepts of the two stimuli
above are veridical only if there is a vertical line segment in the scene, though they locate their
respective line segments in different positions. Is it a psychological law that if one of these per-
cepts represents a vertical line segment, then so must the other? One theory might analyze the
representations of the two stimuli as both having a constituent representation of a line segment’s
vertical orientation, separate from a representation of its position. This account entails that the two
percepts have related veridicality conditions as a necessary consequence of their having a common
type of constituent. An alternative theory might provide independent analyses of the percepts of
the two stimuli, taking one to consist of a primitive representation of a vertical line in the middle
and the other to consist of a primitive representation of a vertical line on the right. In that case,
the content of the one representation does not necessarily imply anything about the content of the
other. Evidence for one or the other of these theories constitutes evidence about whether percepts
of vertical lines in varying positions make up a common explanatory semantic kind or not.
Compositional theories are apt to identify and explain systematic relationships between the
contents of representations because one of the main explanatory roles of representational content
in these theories is to encode the unique common contribution that a representation makes in deter-
mining the contents of more complex representations of which it is a part. I may find the horizontal
line visually pleasing in the second display but ugly in the first. Suppose my representations of both
displays contain a common constituent representation of a horizontal line at position 1, which is
combined from a representation of the line’s orientation and position. It cannot be in virtue of this
constituent alone that I represent the line as pleasing in one surround but ugly in another. So this
constituent cannot represent how pleasing or ugly the line is. The content of a representation must
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be what that representation contributes in common to the representations of which it is a part. And
the content that a complex representation contributes to other representations of which it is a part
is just what it inherits from the representations that are part of it.2 Another way to put the point is
that compositional representations have their contents “intrinsically,” in the following sense: fixing
the contents of the primitive constituents and their mode of combination thereby fixes the content
of the complex representation they compose, in a strictly “context-independent” manner—that is,
with no regard to what else is happening in the world or how the representation is related to any
representations that are not its constituents (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988, Szabó, 2012).
A semantic theory of how perceptual representations are systematically related would be in-
tegral to a “meta-representational” account of why perceptual states have the contents that they
do—what Neander (2017) calls the “content-determinacy” question. An answer to the content-
determinacy question must explain both why the primitives in one’s “perceptual dictionary” repre-
sent certain features rather than others and why their combinations have the semantic import that
they do. Compositional theories do not answer these why-questions, but they place constraints
on the acceptable answers. Any account of how the contents of the primitives are fixed must, for
example, accommodate the contribution that those primitives make to more complex representa-
tions. Moreover, a compositional theory provides a framework for generalizing from an account
of why one representation has the content that it does to an account of why systematically related
representations have the contents that they do (Rescorla, 2019).
Semantic compositionality is a property of representations; it constrains, but does not deter-
mine the sorts of processes or “inferences” that form and operate upon those representations. Com-
positionality does not require, for example, that primitive representations are formed first and then
combined at a later stage. One’s representation of the scene might be computed by synthesizing
prior representations of each line segment. Or one’s visual system might first form a generic rep-
resentation of a scene containing three line segments of different orientations, and then proceed to
work out their specific orientations. Some combination of “analysis” and “synthesis” might take
2This explanatory role of content was a guiding consideration in Frege’s conclusions concerning the denotations
of number terms, names, predicates, and whole sentences, for example (Hintikka, 1983, Burge, 2005).
7 of 57
Compositionality and Context in Perception [DRAFT] Lande
place in the course of arriving at a stable representation of the scene. Of course, certain sorts of
representational processes are more apt for exploiting compositional representations than others. If
a representation of three line segments is composed of three representations of individual line seg-
ments, then the former representation makes distinct contents about those individual line segments
readily available for further processing. Visual search processes can query the representation for a
constituent representation of a horizontal line segment on the left, for example.
Relatedly, the way perceptual representations epistemically support perceptual beliefs depends
on how the contents of perception are taken up in belief, which in turn depends on how the structure
of a perceptual state makes that content available for uptake. If my representation of the three line
segments is composed from constituent representations of each line segment, then it is in principle
possible to distinguish between the warrant that my perceptual state gives for the belief that the
line segment on the left is horizontal and the warrant it gives for the belief that the line segment
on the right is tilted. Perceptual beliefs may be warranted to different degrees by different parts
of my perceptual state. If my perceptual state had a different structure, or if that structure had a
different semantic import, or if the perceptual state were primitive (lacking constituents), then the
explanation of how the perceptual warrant given by that state factors out would have to be different.
2.2 A Basic Theory
I will now sketch a basic semantics from which the analyses of some rudimentary percepts can be
derived. I will motivate various refinements along the way, attending more to the shape of the the-
ory than the formal details. Two features of this basic account are that constituent representations
of the different aspects of a scene have the same type of semantic value (semantic uniformity) and
these constituents can combine without substantive restrictions (unrestricted combination). Many
semantic accounts of perception share these two features, to various approximations (for exam-
ple, Clark, 2004, Fodor, 2008, Kulvicki, 2015). In the next sections, I will argue that we must
reconsider both these features in order to account for core perceptual phenomena.
For now, let us continue to consider perceptual representations of stimuli that consist of three
line segments arranged in a row, each of the same length and color. The segments can occupy one
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or the other of three positions: “position 1” on the left, “position 2” at the center, and “position 3”
on the right. The segments can have one of 4 possible orientations: 0˝ (vertical), 45˝ (tilted right),
90˝ (horizontal), or 135˝ (tilted left). Reproducing the first example from above:
— | {
Viewing this stimulus under normal conditions, I visually represent a horizontal line (call it a) on
the left in position 1, a vertical line (call it b) at the center in position 2, and a tilted line (call it c)
at the right in position 3.3 Call my current percept of this scene “Sabc” (I use boldface characters
to designate mental representations). A semantics of perception aims to specify the condition that
must be satisfied for a perceptual representation to be veridical. For the purposes of distinguishing
Sabc from other percepts of the stimulus set, we can take its veridicality condition to be:
Sabc is perfectly accurate if and only if a is at position 1 and oriented 90˝ and b is at position
2 and oriented 0˝ and c is at position 3 and oriented 45˝.
This characterization of the veridicality condition of my perceptual state rests on several as-
sumptions. First, I assume that perceptual representations function to be about particular property-
bearing items in a scene (in this case, the line segments a, b, and c). Perceptual representations
do not have existentially general contents (Burge, 2010, Schellenberg, 2018), nor do they merely
place features at locations (positions 1, 2, or 3) without attributing them to particular entities (a,
b, c) that occupy those locations (Clark, 2004, Matthen, 2004). Second, I am concerned with
the accuracy conditions, rather than truth conditions, of perceptual states. Whereas truth is an
all or nothing property of propositions, accuracy can come in degrees. If one misrepresents a
as tilted 45˝, one would still be representing it more accurately than if one had represented it as
tilted 0˝. Though I will only discuss the conditions on perfect accuracy here, models in perceptual
psychology purport to explain the degrees to which perceptual states are accurate under different
3I assume that mature neurotypical humans and phylogenetically close primates will normally represent this stim-
ulus in approximately the same way. Still, it is an idealization to talk of “a semantic theory of perception.” Different
individuals, of different species, at different times in their lives will represent things differently and so will require
different semantic theories to capture their representational capacities. Moreover, there is unlikely to be one semantic
theory that covers all perceptual capacities, or even all visual capacities.
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conditions. Moreover, pictures and sub-propositional representations such as demonstrative noun
phrases (“that round jar”) can be evaluated for their accuracy even if they do not in themselves have
truth conditions. And even where representations have both truth conditions and accuracy condi-
tions, accuracy may be independent of truth. Suppose that in uttering “That round jar is empty,”
I thereby demonstratively refer to a square jar that I mistook as round. If the jar is empty, then
by some accounts what I said is true even though it inaccurately characterizes the jar as round.
Throughout, I remain neutral about whether perceptual states have propositional truth conditions
in addition to accuracy conditions.
The goal is to specify the accuracy conditions for every perceptual representation one might
have of the 64 possible stimulus types in this simple stimulus set. One approach would be to
enumerate the accuracy conditions of each perceptual state. However, this approach is not only
cumbersome, it fails to capture systematic patterns in how different stimulus configurations are
represented. For example, each of the line segments in this stimulus set could in principle have
been represented in a given way even if the other two line segments were represented differently.
In order to represent a as at position 1 and horizontal, I need not represent b and c the way I do,
or even at all. Psychological theories ascribe constituent structure to our percepts partly in order
to explain how the way one aspect of the stimulus is represented does or does not depend on the
way another aspect of the stimulus is represented (Lande, 2021). Nearly all psychological models
would treat Sabc as a complex perceptual representation consisting of constituents, ca, cb, and cc,
each representing a different distal contour or line segment.
Instead of enumerating the accuracy conditions of each percept, one can specify principles ac-
cording to which representations of a given structural form derive their contents from the contents
of their constituents. Suppose that Sabc is a “concatenation” of atomic representations, ca`cb`cc,
where a perceptual concatenation of representations is accurate if and only if its constituents are ac-
curate (see Sober, 1976).4 To derive the contents of each total perceptual representation, the theory
also needs to specify what “atomic” representations of line segments are possible and what their
4While concatenation clearly has the flavor of conjunction, it should not be assumed to be a logical operator. For
example, it operates on degrees of accuracy, not on truth values.
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accuracy conditions are. Here is a first pass at a theory, assuming that the atomic representations
attribute both orientation and position to the items that they represent.
Concatenation: (1) For any atomic representations ci, cj, ck, xci ` cj ` cky is a structurally
possible representation.
(2) xci ` cj ` cky is perfectly accurate iff ci is perfectly accurate and cj is perfectly accu-
rate and ck is perfectly accurate.
Atomic representations: (3) The atomic perceptual representations are ca, . . . , ck.
(4) ca is perfectly accurate iff a is at position 1 and oriented 90˝.
(5) cb is perfectly accurate iff b is at position 2 and oriented 0˝.
(6) cc is perfectly accurate iff c is at position 3 and oriented 45˝.
...
Since I am assuming that perceptual representations function to be accurate of the particular
items one encounters in a scene, there may be as many clauses for atomic representations as there
are episodes in which one seems to encounter a distinct line segment. However, there is a sense in
which different representations of particular line segments that are horizontal and at position 1 are
of the same psychological kind. Different representations of horizontal lines at position 1 are the
products of the same general capacity to single out line segments in that position and orientation,
deployed on particular occasions to represent particular individuals in one’s immediate environ-
ment. Though these representations may be of different particulars, they attribute a common set of
features to those particulars (Burge, 2010). We would like to give a semantic characterization of the
common kind (call it “cτ”) under which fall these specific representations (call them “ciτ”), while
respecting the fact that each functions to be accurate of different particulars. One way of doing so
is to provide conditionalized accuracy conditions (cf. Larson and Segal, 1995). For example:
If ciτ is a representation of xi, then ciτ is perfectly accurate iff xi is at position 1 and oriented
90˝.
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I will set aside the question of what it takes for a perceptual state to be a representation of one
particular item rather than another, except to say that it is plausibly a necessary condition that the
item be causally responsible for the formation of the perceptual state (Strawson, 1979).
Can these atomic representations be analyzed even further? As I noted before, the fact that one
can represent a horizontal line segment at any of the three positions is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that we have a number of different primitives that represent specific pairs of orientations and
locations. However, this hypothesis does not fit the evidence that capacities to represent orienta-
tion have psychological signatures that can differ from those of capacities to represent position.
For example, the precision with which one represents a line segment’s orientation may not be the
same as the precision with which one represents its position. This difference between orientation
and location perception can manifest in “illusory conjunctions,” in which one misrepresents which
orientations are located at which positions in the display (Treisman and Schmidt, 1982). For ex-
ample, if I were distracted or had very little time to process the abc display above, I might have
formed a different percept, Sbac, as of a vertical line in position 1, a horizontal line in position 2,
and a right-tilted line in position 3 (Treisman and Paterson, 1984, Golomb et al., 2014). Crucially,
the finding is that I am liable sometimes to represent the very same orientations, but in different
positions. Illusory conjunctions do not misrepresent stimuli wholesale. Rather, I can sometimes
be more precise in my perception of orientation while independently being less precise in my per-
ception of position, with the consequence that sometimes I get the orientations right but swap their
positions in the display. If orientation and position were coded by the same primitive variable in
my visual system, one would expect orientation and position to be perceived necessarily with the
same variance (Lande, 2021). A good explanation of how the precision with which one perceives
an item’s orientation can vary separately from the precision with which one perceives that item’s
position is that these features are each coded by separate constituents with their own psychological
traits (Treisman, 1986, Matthen, 2005).
Accordingly, suppose that atomic representations of contour segments are themselves complex,
consisting of primitive representations ciρ of an item’s position and ciθ of its orientation. For
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example, ca has as constituents ca1, representing a at position 1, and ca90˝ , representing a as
horizontal. The claim is not that one can represent orientation apart from position. It may be
that one can only ever represent orientation at some location or other. So, distinguish between
atomic perceptual representations and their sub-atomic primitives. Atomic representations are the
least complex representations that can occur without being combined with other representations—
they are the simplest “well-formed” representations in a perceptual system. Sub-atomic primitives
are the least complex representations that can vary apart from each other, but which cannot occur
except in combination with other representations . We can model the atomic representations of line
segments as 2-dimensional vectors, xxciρ, ciθyy. While these can be decomposed into independent
components, the first component must always occur in the context of a second component.
As a compositional rule, when an orientation representation is bound to a position represen-
tation, that combination is accurate just in case both of the primitives are accurate of the same
item—just in case that same item has that orientation and that position. Combining primitive
representations has the semantic import that those representations are of the same item. In fact,
illusory conjunctions demonstrate that a representation of an element might be composed from a
primitive representation ciθ of that element’s orientation together with a primitive representation
cjρ of some other element’s position. The primitives that make up an atomic representation do not
have to be “co-indexed,” so to speak. One way for an atomic representation to be inaccurate is
for it to misrepresent either the position or orientation of the item that it represents. But another
way for it to be inaccurate is for it to be a combination of an accurate representation of one item’s
orientation and an accurate representation of a different item’s position.
Finally, consider the semantics of the primitive representations themselves. While composi-
tional principles determine the contents of complex representations, “analog” relations between
primitives can play a role in determining the contents of the primitives. Psychological models
typically treat primitive perceptual representations as related along dimensions of psychological
similarity that correspond to relations or dimensions of represented items in the world (Gauker,
2012, Beck, 2019). For example, just as position 1 is closer to position 2 than to position 3, the
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representation ci1 might be more psychologically similar to the representation ci2 than it is to ci3.
Let µ be a systematic mapping from the positions of primitive representations in psychological
similarity space to the positions of distal features of the world on explanatorily significant dimen-
sions of objective similarity, such that relations of psychological similarity or “distance” between
primitives corresponds to the objective similarity in represented features. Then instead of sepa-
rately specifying the accuracy conditions of each positional representation, one can just specify
that ciρ is perfectly accurate just in case the item that it represents is located at position µpρq, and
likewise for primitive representations of orientation. (Throughout the rest of the paper, I will make
the idealization that µ is the identity function.)
Here, then, is the basic theory in full:
Primitives: (1) For all i P I (where I is a set of indices, such as a, b, c, for indicating specific
perceptual states), ρ P t1, 2, 3u, θ P t0, 45, 90, 135u, ciρ and ciθ are primitive represen-
tations.
(2) If ciρ is a representation of xi, then it is perfectly accurate iff xi is located at position
µpρq.
(3) If ciθ is a representation of xi, then it is perfectly accurate iff xi has orientation µpθq˝.
Feature Integration: (4) For any ciρ and cjθ, xxciρ, cjθyy is a structurally possible representa-
tion.
(5) If xxciρ, cjθyy is a representation of xk, then it is perfectly accurate iff (a) ciρ is perfectly
accurate and cjθ is perfectly accurate, and (b) if ciρ is a representation of xi and cjθ is a
representation of xj , then xi “ xj “ xk.
Concatenation: (6) For any structurally possible representations α, β, and γ, xα ` β ` γy is a
structurally possible representation.
(7) xα ` β ` γy is perfectly accurate iff α is perfectly accurate and β is perfectly accurate
and γ is perfectly accurate.
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It is trivial to extend the theory to accommodate representations of indefinitely large, two- or
three-dimensional displays of line segments with indefinitely fine-grained orientations and posi-
tions. To accommodate representations of items with various colors, sizes, shapes (blobs, corners,
junctions), suppose that additional types of primitives are included in the visual dictionary and can
integrate into the atomic representations. Note that the theory as it stands permits the representa-
tion of multiple line segments located at the same location (for example, “`” and “ˆ”), though it
does not account for the ability to represent these segments as parts of the same cohesive item.
Recall the two features of the theory that I mentioned at the outset. First, the theory character-
izes the constituents of percepts as semantically uniform in that every constituent has the same type
of semantic value. Just as the representations in propositional logic all have truth values, according
to this theory all the constituents of a perceptual representation all function to have accuracy values
(given a specification of the items that they represent). Each constituent of a perceptual represen-
tation determines a complete condition on what the represented item would have to be like for the
constituent to be perfectly accurate. This is true even of the sub-atomic primitives. While the rep-
resentation of an item’s orientation cannot, according to the theory, occur except in combination
with a representation of that item’s location, nevertheless these representations can each in them-
selves be evaluated for their accuracy (cf. Shea, 2018, p. 163–4). Second, these constituents can
in principle combine freely, subject to minimal restrictions on type. As the theory stands, there are
no substantive restrictions on which location primitives can bind with which orientation primitives
or on which atoms can concatenate with each other.
One substantial point of debate concerns whether there are separate primitives for singular and
attributive elements of perceptual representations and, if so, whether these enter into predicational
structures or not.5 The present theory assumes that perceptual representations ultimately function
to be accurate of particular objects and so can have singular accuracy conditions. However, the
theory so far is agnostic about whether representations of position and orientation (ciρ and cjθ)
are composed from more basic singular elements (i and j, say) and distinct general elements (c,
5For some recent discussions, see Clark, 2004, Fodor, 2008, Burge, 2010, Matthen, 2014, Schellenberg, 2018.
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ρ and θ). If the theory is extended to incorporate these distinct types of elements as primitives,
then semantic uniformity would not extend to these basic elements, though it would remain the
case that any complex constituent, representing one aspect of a scene by combining a singular
element and general elements, would have the same semantic role as any other complex constituent
that represents any other aspect of the scene. (By contrast, in English for example it is not just
primitive nouns and verbs that can have different types of semantic values, but more complex
phrases too.) Moreover, if there are distinct singular and general constituents, the theory is agnostic
about whether these are combined predicatively so as to yield propositional truth conditions in
addition to the accuracy conditions specified by the theory.
I want briefly to indicate how this semantic theory relates to other types of projects that are
concerned with the nature of perceptual representation. One project is to say what sorts of abstract
objects perceptual contents are. For example, Peacocke (1992) identifies perceptual contents with
sets of what he calls “scenes.” Others have argued for identifying perceptual contents with sets
of possible worlds (Stalnaker, 1998). These sorts of views say little about how such contents are
compositionally derived according to the way the representational vehicle itself is structured. By
contrast, the primary aim of the theory sketched here is not to give a metaphysics of perceptual con-
tents, but rather to characterize the systematic relationships between such contents (whatever they
turn out to be). The theory describes these systematic relationships by characterizing how struc-
tural relationships between representations induce semantic operations on accuracy conditions.
Another project more concerned with the compositional apparatus of perception is dedicated to
settling whether this apparatus is analog and/or iconic or whether it is symbolic and/or sentence-
like in nature. Many take the answers to these questions to depend on whether there are distinct
singular and general elements in perception that combine through predication. As I have said,
the current theory is agnostic on that point. In any case, it remains a contentious subject exactly
how to carve up distinctions like the one between iconic and symbolic representations. I will
remain neutral about where the current semantic theory falls or how the properties of semantic
uniformity and unrestricted combination bear on this issue. The project in what follows is to see
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how the theory and others like it have to be revised in order to analyze a fuller range of perceptual
phenomena. This project can be pursued quite far—the relevant puzzles and results can be stated in
some detail—without settling the more foundational questions raised in these last few paragraphs.
3 Emergent Content and Context
The theory sketched in the previous section implies that perceptual representations of different
aspects of a scene, and the combinations of these representations, are in large part semantically
uniform and freely combinable. The theory does not stray far from the views that Wertheimer and
his colleagues rebuffed, according to which percepts are mere “and-summations” of their parts.
But the explanatory power and generality of the theory and others like it are at best unclear, for
reasons that were center stage in the Gestalt school. The theory, as it stands, does not account
for the representation of “emergent,” “global,” or higher-order features of items or for the context
effects involved in representing such features.
To a first approximation, emergent features are features that are perceptually attributed to col-
lections of represented items or features in a scene, or which are attributed to individual items in
virtue of their relationship to other represented items in a collection (Pomerantz and Cragin, 2015).
These features include the feature of being an extended contour, forming a closed boundary, being
symmetrical about an axis, having an “average” color or orientation, or even being an “odd one
out” (see Palmer, 1977, Brady et al., 2011). For example, one’s representation of left panel of
Figure 1a goes beyond concatenating representations of the locations and orientations of different
line segments; one represents a specific subset of line segments, including a and b, as forming
a common contour. One’s perceptual representation of the left panel is accurate only if there is
a contour of which both a and b are parts. But the basic theory, as it stands, does not yield this
accuracy condition.
One could posit that the visual dictionary contains primitive representations of various whole
contours, which can be concatenated with one’s total percept of the scene. If the representation of
the whole contour were merely an additional primitive concatenated into the percept, one would
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Emergent features and context effects in perceptual organization: (a) The two line segments, a and b, in
the left panel appear to be part of a common contour, while a physically identical pair of line segments in the right
panel does not (based on Geisler and Super, 2000, p. 682). (b) The “U”-shaped “Part” can be perceived as a discrete
cohesive part of panels H, MH, and M, but not ML or L (from Palmer, 1977, p. 452).
expect it to be possible, in principle, to token the representation of the whole contour without token-
ing the representations of the segments. However, moving or removing the segments dramatically
interferes with one’s ability to represent the whole contour (Field et al., 1993). Moreover, even
when the segments are represented as part of a common whole, representations of the individual
line segments are separable—they can have separate psychological signatures, including different
levels of precision or noise (Pomerantz and Pristach, 1989, Brady and Alvarez, 2015). For ex-
ample, under certain circumstances when viewing the display I may misrepresent one segment or
another as in a different location, even belonging to another object (Treisman and Paterson, 1984).
The hypothesis that the representations of a and b are distinct constituents of the representation
of the whole contour would explain both why the representation of the whole contour cannot occur
without the constituent representations of a and b and why the constituent representations of a and
b could nevertheless have separable signatures (Lande, 2021). One way to frame this hypothesis is
to suppose that there is a type of representation of the higher-order attribute of being a contour that
must be combined with representations of line segments so as to represent those line segments as
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parts of a common contour. Alternatively, representations of extended contours might be thought
of as composed from representations of individual segments according to a distinctive mode of
combination—a contour-specific integration operator. Either way, the basic semantic theory will
have to be expanded to characterize how representations of higher-order attributes combine with
or are composed from these more basic representations.
The representation of emergent features is closely related to the ubiquity of perceptual context
effects. Perceptual context effects arise when the way one aspect of a scene is represented depends
on the way other aspects of the scene are represented (see Schwartz et al., 2007, Todorović, 2010).
It is not the case that the same atomic representations of line segments with specific orientations
and positions can compose the same perceptual content no matter the context in which these repre-
sentations are embedded. One represents a and b as belonging to a common contour in the context
of representing the “connecting” line segments in the left panel of Figure 1a. When one does not
represent connecting segments, as in the right panel, one does not represent a and b as part of a
common contour. As Wertheimer put it, the connecting lines are “pro-structural” elements that
enable one to represent the segments as part of a common contour. By contrast, “contra-structural”
elements preclude the perception of a whole contour. While one can distinctly represent a co-
herent U-shaped contour in panels “H,” “MH,” and “M” of Figure 1b, it is extremely difficult to
discern this same contour as a cohesive part in panels “ML” and “L,” though one can individually
discriminate the very same component line segments (Palmer, 1977, Ankrum and Palmer, 1991).
The representations of those segments, ci, cj, ck, can compose a representation of a contour (or
can combine in some way with a representation of a contour attribute) in some contexts but not
others. More generally, one cannot attribute higher-order features to arbitrary sets of items, and the
higher-order features that one attributes to some items depends on how one represents other items
in the scene.
Context effects also arise when representations of first-order features of items are influenced by
one’s representations of higher-order features. For example, “iso-feature suppression” occurs when
representations of a given type of feature make it harder to represent the same or similar features
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Figure 2: The simultaneous tilt effect for gratings of lines. (a) Though the central grating is physically vertical, it
appears to be tilted slightly clockwise. (b) When the center and surround have physically similar orientations, their
perceived orientations are “repulsed”; when they have substantially different orientations, their perceived orientations
can be perceptually “attracted” (from Clifford, 2014, p. 4).
in the scene (Li, 1999). It is more difficult to represent a line segment as having a given orientation
if it is surrounded by line segments of similar orientations than if it is presented in isolation. As
a result, contrasting features are often emphasized in perception. It turns out that these effects are
especially operative when one represents the features as belonging to the same object or group.
For example, in the “simultaneous tilt effect,” the perceived orientation of a contour or grating
is “repulsed” from the perceived orientation of its surround when these differ slightly (Figure 2).
The strength of this effect is a function of the perceptual evidence that the target and the surround
belong to the same object: the effect is substantially weaker if one does not perceive the target and
the surround as part of the same surface or object. A higher level type of context effect occurs when
the perceived orientation, position, or motion of an item depends on the representation of another
item or configuration that serves as a “reference frame.” For example, in Figure 3, one tends to
see the triangle as oriented to the right if embedded in the horizontal rectangle or as oriented to the
upper left if embedded in the tilted rectangle.
“Context,” as I am using it here, does not refer to the distal environment in which a represen-
tation is tokened (its context of tokening; analogous to the “context of utterance” in the case of
language), but rather refers to the type of representation with which some constituent is combined
(the constituent’s representational context or context of embedding; analogous to sentential and
discourse contexts in language). Contrary to the basic theory offered above, it is not the case that a
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Figure 3: Reference frame effects: an equilateral triangle appears to be pointing to the right when enclosed in a
horizontal rectangle, while a physically identical triangle appears to point to the upper left when enclosed in a tilted
rectangle.
given perceptual content can freely occur in arbitrarily different contexts of embedding. As Camp
suggested, perceptual abilities to represent contours, orientations, and other features are “highly
local and context-dependent.”
How can we accommodate these paradigmatically “holistic” phenomena within a composi-
tional framework? In particular, if the content of a representation depends only on the contents of
its own constituents and how they are related, how can the representation of an item depend on
that representation’s context of embedding? Broadly, there are three ways to give a compositional
analysis of context effects. First, the same set of constituents might stand in different structural
relationships, and so form a different type of construction, depending on the context in which they
are embedded. I will argue that the same representations of contour segments can combine into a
representation of a whole contour in some contexts but not others. An analogy here is to structural
disambiguation in language: the words that make up the string, “Kiki and Jiji,” are part of a com-
mon constituent in the context of the sentence “Tombo saw Kiki and Jiji,” while the same words
are parts of distinct constituents in the sentence “Tombo saw Kiki and Jiji jumped.”
Second, representational context might bias which representation of a stimulus gets formed in
the first place. I will argue that the tilt effect arises when a representation of an oriented surround
“selects for” contrasting representations of the center’s orientation. Here, an analogy can be made
with the role that sentential context can play in lexical disambiguation: the word-form “duck” is
mapped to one lexical item in the sentence “Kiki saw a duck” while it is mapped to a different
lexical item in the sentence “Kiki had to duck.” The basic theory sketched above makes no provi-
sions for anything like structural or lexical disambiguation. Either type of analysis for perceptual
21 of 57
Compositionality and Context in Perception [DRAFT] Lande
context effects requires giving up the presumption that perceptual representations can combine
without substantive restriction.
Third, context effects might arise in virtue of the different semantic roles that perceptual repre-
sentations can have. I will argue that reference frame effects arise when one perceptually represents
something as having a specific orientation relative to y, where the content of this representation
functions to be integrated with the content of a representation that supplies a reference item, y.
Likewise in language, adjectival modifiers such as “former” function to combine with common
nouns such as “champion” or “professor” so as to represent someone as no longer a member of
whatever class is denoted by that noun. This sort of analysis requires distinguishing between dif-
ferent types of semantic roles that perceptual representations can have. Just as “former” cannot in
itself be an accurate or inaccurate characterization of an individual, so too a representation of an
item’s relative orientation does not in itself determine a complete accuracy condition. The content
of this representation constitutively functions to integrate with the content of other representations.
In the next section, I will motivate and elaborate these analyses of perceptual context effects.
In Section 5, I will argue that these particular analyses all reveal a close relationship between con-
text effects and the objectivity of perception. The discussion here broadly echoes one in natural
language semantics. Semantic theories of language typically start by covering relatively simple
fragments of a language. These analyses usually require refinements and revisions in order to deal
with context effects. For example, the meanings of quantifier phrases, adjectival constructions,
conditionals, tense clauses, and anaphoric pronouns appear to shift depending on the broader sen-
tential and discourse contexts in which these constructions are embedded. If the content of a
construction is derived compositionally from the contents of its parts and their arrangement, then
that construction’s meaning must be independent of its relation to other external constructions.
So, if a phrase appears to take different meanings when embedded in different sentences, then a
compositional analysis would have to show how superficially similar surface strings differ in their
underlying syntax when they occur in different sentences, in line with familiar examples of syntac-
tic and lexical disambiguation, or else how, despite appearances, these strings in fact have the same
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meaning that functions to integrate with the meaning of the phrase with which it is combined (see
Partee, 2004, Janssen, 2011). Some doubt that such analyses will always be plausible. Hintikka,
for example, writes that “Whenever the meaning (interpretation) of an expression depends on the
wider context in which it is embedded, a violation of compositionality is in the offing” (Hintikka,
1983, p. 265; see also Higginbotham, 1986, 2003). Camp’s skepticism about the prospects of
semantic theories of pictures and perceptual representations echo these doubts about the composi-
tionality of context effects in language. By contrast, my approach in what follows is more aligned
with those who argue that sophisticated compositional analyses along the lines indicated above are
in fact central to understanding why context effects arise (for example Partee, 2007).
4 The Semantics of Context Effects
I now sketch compositional explanations of the three context effects introduced in the previous
section: context effects in contour perception, tilt effects, and reference frame effects. These ef-
fects have been studied extensively and each provides an illuminating example of a way to analyze
context effects within a compositional framework. In particular, each illustrates how an adequate
compositional semantics of perception must give up commitments either to unrestricted combina-
tion or semantic uniformity.
4.1 Contour Integration
Consider one’s perceptual representations of the left and right panels in Figure 1a. We want to
account for the fact that one’s percept of the left panel is accurate only if a and b belong to the
same contour while one’s percept of the right panel can be accurate even if a and b do not belong
to the same contour. There is no reason, on the minimal theory, to expect the atomic representations
of a and b to be different between the two panels. Moreover, there is no way, on this theory, to
distinguish between the content of ca ` cb as it occurs in the representation of one panel and
the content of ca ` cb as it occurs in the representation of the other. Of course, one represents
the rest of the display quite differently. We can distinguish between the accuracy conditions of
the total representation ca ` cb ` Γ of the left panel and of the total representation ca ` cb ` Γ1
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of the right panel, where Γ and Γ1 comprise the representations of all the remaining items in
the respective panels. However, this difference still will not encompass that ca ` cb ` Γ, unlike
ca ` cb ` Γ1, is accurate only if a and b are part of the same contour. Indeed, ambiguous stimuli
such as a matrix of dots can give rise to different percepts of grouping, into columns or into rows,
without any difference in the basic items that one represents. To explain the context effect requires
ascribing additional structure to the perceptual representations.
One way to amend the theory is to suppose that there is a primitive representation of a higher-
order attribute, call it “CONTOUR,” that must be combined with representations of individual
contour segments so as to represent a whole contour, x, to which those segments belong. Such
an amendment would require specifying not just the content of this representation, but also how it
combines with representations of individual segments. This primitive cannot just be concatenated
with the representations of the individual items. Such concatenation would fail to capture the fact
that the representation of the whole contour requires the representation of the segments—the repre-
sentation of the whole contour is not self-standing and is not just tacked on alongside the rest of the
constituent representations of segments. Moreover, we need some way to capture the fact that a, b,
and certain other line segments are represented as part of the contour, while many others are not.
The integration and concatenation operations defined above are not fit for the job. There must be
a distinctive way of selectively combining certain representations of individual items to represent
the higher-order feature of being a contour. To simplify things for present purposes, I will eschew
talk of a CONTOUR primitive and the attendant questions that arise about how this primitive
combines with representations of contour segments. Instead, I will pursue the idea that there is a
contour-specific mode of combination, a contour-construction or contour operator, xci ˝ . . . ˝ cny,
by which representations ci, . . . , cn of individual contour segments compose representations of
extended contours.6 Whereas the representations of a and b enter into such a structural relationship
6This approach is analogous to a semantics that treats a term “syncategorematically” as a grammatical particle
rather than “categorematically” as an item in the lexicon (see Quine, 1986, p. 26–30). Both approaches can yield the
same veridicality conditions. I will not discuss the explanatory considerations that would favor one approach over the
other. For now, I pursue the “contour operator” approach for simplicity. Whether through construction with a contour
attributive or through a contour-specific mode of combination, representations of contour segments must be able to
relate in a different way than through the integration and concatenation operations defined above.
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in one’s percept of the left panel, they do not in one’s percept of the right panel. An adequate
analysis of the context effect should provide evidence for such a structural relation and explain
why constituents can stand in that relation in some contexts but not others.
4.1.1 Evidence for Contour Structure
The critical evidence that the percepts of a and b are structurally related in the left panel in a
way they are not in the right panel comes from studies of grouping advantages. Normally one is
substantially more accurate, more precise, and faster at detecting, identifying, attending to, and
holding in memory sets of items or properties that are perceived as unified—as parts or features
of a common entity or group—compared with sets of items or properties that are not perceived
as unified. Sets of contour segments that are perceived as belonging to the same contour are
more visually salient and more quickly, accurately, and precisely detected than sets of contour
segments that are not perceived as unified (Field et al., 1993). One is also more quick, accurate,
and precise at detecting segments when they are perceived as part of a unified whole contour
(Kapadia et al., 1995), at shifting attention between parts of a common whole (Barenholtz and
Feldman, 2003, Kimchi et al., 2015), and at discriminating between features of those parts, such as
their orientations (Kempgens et al., 2013). Similar advantages accrue to memorizing and recalling
features of elements that one perceives as parts of a common whole. Grouping advantages are
not merely effects of recognition, familiarity, or training, since advantages can obtain for entirely
unfamiliar stimuli.
The classic explanation of grouping advantages is that the representation of unity corresponds
to the unity of representations. Individual elements are visually represented as parts of a unified
whole if and only if the representations of those elements are constituents of a common represen-
tation. It is easier and more efficient to encode, store, and manipulate sets of representations that
are structurally related than those that are structurally unrelated. It is also easier and more efficient
to query relationships between sibling constituents of a common parent representation, since the
search space is restricted to the constituents of that representation. So, grouping advantages obtain
for items that are perceived as belonging to a common whole because the representations of those
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items are in construction with each other.
Whether a set of elements is perceived as unified, therefore giving rise to grouping advantages,
depends on how one represents other elements in the scene. Palmer (1977) asked subjects to report
whether three-item sets of line segments were present or not in larger six-item sets of line segments.
He found that subjects are categorically faster and more accurate in detecting the presence of a
subset of line segments, such as the line segments making up the “U”-shaped part in Figure 1b,
when one sees those segments as forming a coherent, complete part of a figure (as in panels H,
MH, and M) than in contexts where one sees those segments as belonging to different parts (for
example, ML and L; see also Palmer and Beck, 2007, Ankrum and Palmer, 1991, Brady et al.,
2011). Grouping advantages do not depend directly on the other line segments one perceives in the
scene. Ambiguous stimuli, such as arrays of dots that can be grouped either as columns or as rows,
can give rise to different percepts of unity and different corresponding grouping advantages, despite
representing all the same basic items. When the perceived unity, and corresponding grouping
advantages, of a set of items varies from context to context, it is because the different contexts
influence the representation of the target items: only in some contexts do the representations of
those items form a representation of a whole contour.
4.1.2 Compositional Analysis
Why are the same representations integrated into a contour representation in some contexts but
not others? To answer this, we can turn to computational models of contour integration. Despite
the artificiality of Figure 1, contour integration is a critical perceptual achievement. The bounding
contours of objects often are interrupted by occluding surfaces, shadows, highlights, or matching
textures, and yet we effortlessly distinguish the unified boundaries of these different objects. Even
when the different surfaces in a scene have fully visible, uninterrupted boundaries, the light at the
eye does not determine which edges belong to the same objects. Models of contour integration seek
to explain how the visual system accurately represents which contour segments belong to the same
object. These models standardly treat representations of the bounding contours along the outline
of an object as recursively structured from more basic representations, ci, of minimal contour seg-
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ments at a given spatial scale. Elder and Goldberg (2002), for example, model representations of
extended contours as ordered sets of representations of contour segments: xpα1, . . . ,αnqy. Let each
αi be either a complex representation of an extended contour or else an atomic representation of a
contour segment, ci. It is not the case that any arbitrary sequence of contour representations, of ran-
domly scattered contour segments for example, can form a representation as of a cohesive contour.
Models of contour integration specify constraints on how representations of contour segments can
be combined.7 We can formulate these constraints in terms of a contour operator, xα1 ˝ . . . ˝ αny,
which returns a complex representation, xpα1, . . . ,αnqy, just in case the constituents satisfy the
conditions of the operator.8 These complex contour representations are accurate if and only if their
constituents are accurate and represent parts of the contour represented by the whole:
Contour Integration: (4) If xα1 ˝ . . . ˝ αny is a representation of x, then it is perfectly accurate
iff for each immediate constituent αi (1 ď i ď n):
(a) αi is perfectly accurate, and
(b) if αi is a representation of y, then y is a part of x.
The explanation of the context effects rests on the constraints on the contour operator. Most
models of contour integration incorporate some version of the classic Gestalt principle of “good
continuation” as a constraint on how representations of contour segments can combine into a rep-
resentation of an extended contour. Field et al. (1993)’s “association field” is a classic example.
The association field embodies a set of rules or constraints for how a given contour representa-
tion can combine with another, as a function of how well-aligned the represented positions and
orientations of those contours are.9 The association field systematically constrains which complex
contour representations are possible as a function of what its constituents are.
7The psychologist Brian Keane writes, “Just as linguists must work hard to discern the eligible phonemes and
computational rules that ultimately lead to the well-formed syntax of a native speaker, so too must vision scientists
carefully design experiments to figure out the features and compositional rules that govern [contour integration]”
(Keane, 2018, p. 5).
8Cf. Geisler and Super (2000)’s “grouping operator.”
9As Hess et al. (2015) describes it, contour integration only occurs when the represented orientations of the edges
differ by no more than 60˝ and their represented positions are no farther apart than 4-6 edge lengths (for closely related
rules on when contours can be amodally completed, see Kellman and Shipley, 1991).
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Contemporary probabilistic and Bayesian models of contour integration treat these constraints
more softly. In these models, the contour operator or association field can be thought of as deter-
mining the “binding strengths” between contour representations, as a function of how well aligned
the represented contours are (cf. Geisler et al., 2001, Geman et al., 2002, Zhu and Mumford, 2006).
As a first pass, the binding strength of a set of representations characterizes the degree to which
these representations can enter into construction together—what one might call their degree of
well-formedness. Geisler et al. (2001) and Elder and Goldberg (2002) define binding strengths
in terms of conditional probability distributions. To a first approximation, the binding strength of
two edge representations, c1 and c2, is the ratio of the likelihood that these two representations
could be the constituents of a common contour representation, P pα “ c1,β “ c2|xα ˝ βyq, to the
likelihood that these two representations could occur as unrelated constituents of a total percept,
P pα “ c1,β “ c2| „ xα ˝ βyq. These “likelihoods” need not, in principle, correspond to either
the probability that a given combination actually will occur, which depends on a number of factors
including specific stimulus cues and prior expectations, or the probability that such a combination
would be accurate. Like prior models, these probabilistic models of the association field system-
atically constrain the formability of contour representations, now as a matter of degree, strictly
as a function of what their constituents are—namely, as a function of the alignment between the
represented positions and orientations.
Following, Elder and Goldberg (2002), the binding strength of a complex contour represen-
tation can be factored into the binding strengths of each succeeding pair of constituents of the
contour representation. The more aligned the positions and orientations represented by c1 and c2,
the more these representations are able to combine. So, the degree to which a contour represen-
tation is structurally possible depends on the alignment between pairs of represented, neighboring
segments along the contour.10 At a high level of abstraction, the constraint on combining represen-
tations of contour segments into representations of whole contours is something like this:
Contour Integration: (5) (a) The binding strength of xcρθ ˝ cρ1θ1y is proportional to the align-
10As Elder et al. (2018) suggests, this is an idealization: the binding strength may depend also on whether, for
example, the whole contour can be represented as closed.
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ment between pρ, θq and pρ1, θ1q.
(b) The binding strength of xα1 ˝ . . . ˝ αny is a product of the binding strengths of
each pair, αi,αi`1 (1 ď i ď n ´ 1).
Disregarding the different ways that empirical theories mathematically define alignment, all
models will take the representations of a and b in Figure 1a to have a binding strength approaching
zero. That is, ca and cb are not, in themselves, combinable (or: they have a vanishingly small
capacity to combine). However, one’s representation of a in the left panel can combine with one’s
representation of the adjacent element to its lower right, which in turn can combine with one’s
representation of that element’s neighbor, and so on. So, ca and cb are combinable in the context of
combining also with representations of these connecting elements, ca ˝ . . . ˝ cb. Since there is no
clear path from a to b in the right panel, the representations of a and b do not come into construction
with each other and one does not therefore represent them as parts of a common contour. In the
case of Figure 1b, the addition of “contra-structural” elements can destroy the perceived unity of a
set of elements because in these contexts other combinations of representations are much stronger
or simpler (Palmer, 1977; see also Geisler and Super, 2000, Feldman et al., 2014).
Not all contour representations are combinable, and those that are combinable are not equally
so. As I argue elsewhere (Lande, 2021), part of what marks the association field as a structural
constraint—part of a “contour grammar”—is that it systematically constrains which complex rep-
resentations of contours can psychologically occur as a function of what their constituents are. This
constraint abstracts from the variable input and background conditions that drive the formation of a
specific representation on a particular occasion. Of course, the association field is part of a broader
model of how a particular representation is formed on the basis of a particular sensory input and
background conditions—an account of “contour inference.” Such an account will include other
principles by which representations of contour segments are computed from specific sensory cues,
as well as principles by which prior expectations, task goals, and attentional selection can influence
the formation of one representation rather than another.11 However, even abstracting from these
11In the Bayesian models described above, what I am describing as a generative grammar of contours is encoded in
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aspects of processing, there is a substantive structural constraint on the combinability of contour
representations. This constraint suffices to explain the context effect.
4.1.3 Representational Function of the Context Effect
The substantive constraints on how contour representations can combine serve a representational
function in light of the semantic import that such combinations have. A principal discovery in
contemporary research on perceptual organization is that the constraints on perceptual organization
correspond closely to the statistical relationships between parts of a common object (Brunswik and
Kamiya, 1953, Geisler et al., 2001, Elder and Goldberg, 2002). Edges that are nearby each other
and aligned, or that are part of a sequence of pairs of such edges, generally are far more likely
to be part of a common contour than not. Substantially misaligned edges that are far apart and
not connected by any smoothly linking edges are very unlikely to be part of a common contour.
The constraints on how representations of contour segments can combine in different contexts
ensure that composite representations of whole contours will have some minimal reliability of
being accurate in the perceiver’s normal environment. The representations that are least able to
combine in a given representational context are also the ones whose combination is least likely to
be accurate in that kind of context. These combinatorial constraints therefore constitute one aspect
of the visual system’s pursuit of representational accuracy.
It is a contingent fact that our visual contour grammar is coordinated in this way with the actual
statistics of contours. In principle, the representational combinability of contour representations
need not have corresponded to the objective combinability of contours in the world. The well-
formedness of an English sentence, for example, is not a reliable guide to its truth. If the present
analysis is right, then the combinability of a set of contour representations is a guide to the plausi-
bility of the representation that they compose. In terms of the Bayesian models described above,
an optimal system for computing accurate representations of natural contours is one in which a
a generative grammar for how contour representations can be composed from representations of
component segments models how real-world contours are normally organized from component
the likelihoods, while these other factors are encoded as input data, priors, and cost functions.
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segments (cf. Yuille and Kersten, 2006, Tenenbaum et al., 2011).
4.2 Simultaneous Tilt Effect
I argued that in the case above a given set of basic representations might be combinable into a
representation of a higher-order feature (a contour) in one context of embedding but not in another.
Context can also influence how one represents the first-order features of individual items. In the
simultaneous tilt effect, for example, the perceived orientation of a contour or grating is “repulsed”
from the perceived orientation of its surround when the physical orientations of these differ slightly,
and is “attracted” when the orientations are nearer to orthogonal (Figure 2). In principle, there are
a number of different ways one might analyze the tilt effect.
One possibility is that the tilt effect is a result of a semantic operation on the contents of con-
stituent representations of the central and surround stimuli. Plausibly, perceptual representations
can have indeterminate contents (see, for example, Nanay, 2020). Suppose the representation of
the central contour or grating attributes an indeterminate orientation, or a range of orientations.
The compositional result of combining this representation with representations of surrounding
contours might be a complex representation that attributes more determinate orientations to the
center and surround contours, such that these more determinate orientations exaggerate the differ-
ence between the center and surround. While this particular analysis is in principle available, it is
empirically implausible. As the title of Solomon and Morgan (2009)’s paper, “Strong Tilt Illusions
Always Reduce Orientation Acuity,” indicates, one is in fact able to discriminate the orientation of
the central stimulus much more finely when it is not subject to a strong tilt effect.
Instead of locating tilt effects in a semantic operation on contents, we should look to structural
constraints on how representations of the center can best combine with representations of the sur-
round. Representations and their combinations are formed under conditions of uncertainty. Given
the inevitability of noise, the proximal stimulus arising from the central contour or grating will
always permit a number of distinct orientation representations. In viewing Figure 2a, the visual
system will register some sensory cues indicating that the central contours are vertical and some
cues consistent with those contours being tilted. The system may also register that the central
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contours are part of the same pattern as the surrounding contours. The representations of the sur-
round may be biased against combining with representations of the central contours as vertical and
toward combining with representations of those contours as tilted away from the surround. As a
result, these more contrastive representations are selected to combine with the representation of
the surround. I will call this sort of “disambiguation” by context, structural selection.
4.2.1 Evidence for Selection
I will briefly survey the evidence (a) that the tilt effect involves the formation of distinct represen-
tations that attribute different orientations, and (b) that the tilt effect depends on the representation
of one stimulus being combined with the representation of the other.
As early as the primary visual cortex (V1), different patterns of neural activity arise in popu-
lations that are tuned to the orientation of stimuli in one position of the visual field, depending on
activity in populations that are tuned to the orientations of surrounding stimuli (Gilbert and Wiesel,
1990, Kapadia et al., 2000). Differences in the activity of a neural population do not in themselves
imply differences in the representations that those patterns realize or cause. However, in this case
the differences in neural activity have a clear perceptual significance. When the visual system reg-
isters a vertical stimulus, a host of neurons will fire, with the strongest response in neurons that are
tuned to vertical orientations and gradually weaker responses in neurons that are tuned for increas-
ingly off-vertical orientations. When a central stimulus is embedded in a surrounding stimulus,
neurons that would typically fire for a central stimulus with an orientation similar to the surround
are suppressed while neurons tuned to substantially different orientations are left unaffected. As a
result, when a vertical stimulus is embedded in a surround that is tilted slightly leftward, say, neu-
rons that tend to prefer slightly right-tilting stimuli in the center are suppressed while other neurons
that respond to central stimuli that are tilted in the other direction from the surround are unaffected,
left to murmur at their normal level. The hush of the “slightly left-tilted”-coding neurons together
with the continuing murmurs of the neurons that code for “slightly right-tilted” orientations mean
that the whole population of neurons that are responding to the central stimulus behaves approx-
imately as it would to an isolated stimulus that is tilted slightly rightward. This population-level
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response aligns well with perception, since one in fact perceives the central vertical stimulus as
tilted slightly away from its surround. It is reasonable to conclude that these modulations of neural
activity give rise to distinct types of perceptual representations of the central contours: c0˝ , say,
in the context of representing a parallel surround, and c2˝ in the context of representing a 20˝
left-tilted surround.
The strength of tilt effects depends significantly on the strength of the perceptual evidence that
the central line or grating and the surrounding pattern belong to a common contour or pattern. Tilt
effects become substantially weaker when the central stimulus is perceptually segregated from the
surrounding pattern, for example when the central contours appear to be at different depths, to
have different levels of contrast, or to be too misaligned (Qiu et al., 2013). The degree to which
tilt representations suppress each other has also been shown to increase with the likelihood that the
represented contours would be part of the same object in a typical scene (Schwartz et al., 2009,
Coen-Cagli et al., 2012). Further, a number of models of contour integration predict the tilt effect,
suggesting that the effect is intimately related to the principles governing how representations
of contour segments combine into a representation of a cohesive contour (Kapadia et al., 2000,
Schwartz et al., 2005, Keemink et al., 2018, Linsley et al., 2020).
4.2.2 Compositional Analysis
The sort of analysis I will propose is that, abstracting away from represented positions, a repre-
sentation of the form xc0˝ ˝ c´20˝y, representing a vertical segment connected to a segment that is
tilted 20˝ to the left, generally will have a weaker binding strength than representations of the form
xc2˝ ˝ c´20˝y, representing a 2˝ right-tilted segment connected to a 20˝ left-tilted surround. So,
given that one is representing the surround as tilted 20˝ to the left, there is a structural preference
to represent the center as tilted slightly to the right. In order to counteract this structural preference
and represent the central contours as vertical, the physical contours would in fact have to be tilted
slightly toward the surround.
For a general account, I draw on Schwartz et al. (2009)’s model of tilt effects (see also Schwartz
et al., 2007, Coen-Cagli et al., 2012, 2015). According to this model, the representations of the
33 of 57
Compositionality and Context in Perception [DRAFT] Lande
different parts of a common contour or pattern must be normalized, so that there is as little statis-
tical coordination between the representations as possible. Neighboring segments along a contour
tend to be highly correlated in their orientations. If one segment is vertical, the next connecting
segment is likely to be close to vertical and unlikely to be horizontal. While some degree of one
segment’s orientation will be predictable from the neighboring segment’s orientation, some degree
will not be. Representations of the segments are “normalized” with respect to each other to the
extent that the representation of the one is conditionally independent of the representation of the
other, given that they both represent connected parts of a common contour. What this means is
that the representations carry as little redundant information about each other as possible, given
that they are representing the same contour. Whereas many models of perception entail that the
representation of a given item must be normalized with respect to the representation of other items,
a crucial component of Schwartz et al.’s model is the assumption that representations should only
be normalized with respect to representations of the same structure. So, the constituents of a com-
plex representation should be normalized with respect to each other but not with respect to other
unrelated representations (Figure 4a). As a structural constraint, a set of representations is more
able to combine the more the constituents are normalized with respect to each other—that is, the
more they represent non-redundant, distinctive features of their respective targets (see also Barlow,
2001).
Under conditions of uncertainty, the normalization constraint will usually bias the visual system
toward exaggerating the contrastive features of an object. Suppose the visual system treats two
sensory cues as arising from different parts of the same object, which is estimated to be largely
uniform. Suppose these cues indicate a small but non-accidental difference in orientation between
two parts of the object—a difference that cannot be attributed merely to noise. The normalization
constraint gives greater weight to combining representations according to which these parts really
differ than it does to combining representations according to which the parts are redundant. Hence
the “repulsion” in the perceived orientations of the center and surround when these are represented
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a) Representations of parts of the same contour or pattern should be normalized with respect to each other
but not with respect to representations of independent objects (from Coen-Cagli et al., 2015, p. 1651). (b) Representing
the central bar as connecting the flankers by the smoothest curve (indicated here in blue) requires representing the
central bar as tilted slightly away from the flankers (from Keemink and van Rossum, 2016, p. 168).
as parts of the same object and when they give rise to tilt cues that differ slightly but significantly.12
In fact, a number of models suggest that a bias against combining constituents that represent
orientations that are either too similar or too dissimilar is derivable from something like the good
continuation constraint described in the previous section (Kapadia et al., 2000, Schwartz et al.,
2005, Keemink and van Rossum, 2016). The alignment between contours is a function of both the
position and orientation of those contours (Field et al., 1993). Except when two contour segments
form a straight line, the smoothest continuation from one to the next will typically require that
they have different orientations, depending on their respective positions. While one segment is
unlikely to differ radically in orientation from the last, they are unlikely to be identical either. In
the specific situations that give rise to the repulsive tilt effect, “the smoothest continuations of
the surround elements tilts the percept away from the surround and, in special cases, attracts it”
(Keemink and van Rossum, 2016, p. 171; Figure 4b). The specific bias against combinations of
12A similar explanation can be given for why there is a slight attractive effect when the target and surround have
very different orientations. In this case, the normalization requirement privileges the representation of non-accidentally
similar orientations in a stimulus for which heterogeneity is the norm (see Schwartz et al., 2009).
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similar representations may therefore be part and parcel of a constraint on representing smoothly
aligned contours.
4.2.3 Representational Function of the Tilt Effect
It is natural to treat tilt effects as biasing one toward inaccurate estimates of the orientations of
things, over-estimating differences at the cost of accuracy. It is true that tilt effects sacrifice perfect
accuracy on the rare occasions where it might be possible. But we perceive under conditions of
uncertainty. One way to reduce uncertainty is to rely on the relationships between items in the
world. A self-standing contour segment is a rarefied thing. Contour segments are almost always
local parts of some larger, smoothly connected structure. So even if there is evidence that a par-
ticular segment is vertical, say, evidence that the segment connects to surrounding segments may
call for representing the central segment in a way that makes most sense of that segment’s position
in the overall structure being represented. In this case, that means representing what is distinctive
about the item in a way that best integrates into a representation of a smoothly continuing contour.
A system that does not exhibit tilt effects, because it does not take into account surrounding infor-
mation and instead treats all contours as independently “shrink-wrapped,” to borrow a phrase form
Wijntjes and Rosenholtz (2018), would likely be less accurate in representing whole contours and
the distinctive features of their parts (see, for example, Linsley et al., 2020). Tilt effects exem-
plify a sensitivity to and capitalization on the structure of items in the world in order to compose
representations that are reliably, if only approximately, accurate.
Moreover, the normalization constraint demands compositional structures in which each con-
stituent representation of a part is as insulated as possible from the potential error of other con-
stituents. A consequence of normalization is that the representation that is formed for one part of
an item carries more content that is distinctive to that part while implying less about the features
of other parts. This means that the inaccuracy or unreliability of one constituent need not imply
the inaccuracy or unreliability of the others. When these representations combine into a whole, the
possibilities for error are thereby regimented (Attneave, 1954, Barlow, 2001). The complex repre-
sentation that these constituents form has the greatest chance of being accurate despite variability
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in the accuracy of its parts. Tilt effects arise from biases for combinations of representations that
make content about each local part of an object reliably accurate and independently extractable
within a reliably accurate representation of the whole object.
4.3 Reference Frame Effects
So far I have argued that context can influence perception by regulating either the structural rela-
tionships between representations or through selecting the types of representations that enter into
such relationships. In each of these cases, a compositional analysis requires giving up the principle
that perceptual representations can combine more or less without substantive restriction. I will mo-
tivate a different type of analysis of the effect that a frame of reference has on the perception of an
item’s orientation. Figure 3 offers one illustration. As Attneave (1968) pointed out, an equilateral
triangle might be seen as “pointing” in any of three directions, corresponding to its three corners,
but it is never seen as pointing in more than one direction at a time. Context heavily influences
which of these orientations is attributed to the triangle. The very same triangle in Figure 3 is seen
as pointed to the right when embedded in a horizontal rectangle, while it is seen as pointed to the
upper left when embedded in an obliquely oriented rectangle.
Palmer (1980) demonstrated that, other things equal, if a figure is ambiguous with respect to
its orientation, one tends to see it as having the orientation that is closest to being either parallel
or perpendicular to a whole configuration of which the figure is perceived as a part. In kind with
the previous analysis of tilt effects, one could propose that reference frame effects merely consist
in the structural selection of different representations of the triangle’s orientation. Suppose that
the triangle admits of a set of potential representations, tθ, tθ1 , and tθ2 , each of which attributes
a different absolute orientation. On this account, if the rectangle is represented as oriented a cer-
tain way, then the representation of the rectangle is most able to combine with whichever triangle
representation assigns an orientation that is closest to parallel or perpendicular with the rectangle’s
represented orientation. Against this hypothesis, a significant body of literature suggests that one
tends to represent the triangles in Figure 3 as having the same relative orientation in each case:
as oriented parallel to . I will suggest that this representation does not determine a complete
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accuracy condition. Much like the adjectival modifier “former,” the representation does not itself
characterize an item in a way that can be evaluated as accurate or inaccurate. Instead, the represen-
tation of relative orientation constitutively functions to combine with a representation of an object
that serves as a reference frame, so as to compose a more complex representation of the triangle as
oriented parallel to that particular object. It is this more complex representation that accurately or
inaccurately represents the orientation of the triangle relative to the orientation of the rectangular
reference frame.
4.3.1 Evidence for the Representation of Relative Orientation
The claim that we perceptually represent things as having orientations relative to some object or
objects that serve as an extrinsic frame of reference—for example, that one perceptually represents
the triangle as oriented parallel to the surrounding rectangle—has substantial theoretical prece-
dent, playing an especially central role in theories of shape representation, object recognition, and
motion perception (Marr and Nishihara, 1978, Palmer, 1989, Xu et al., 2017, Lauffs et al., 2019).
One source of support for the claim comes from patients with “object-based” visual neglect. Vi-
sual neglect can be a symptom of cortical lesions due to stroke and is normally characterized by
an inability to attend to certain areas in the scene. For example, many neglect patients have diffi-
culty attending to the left of the visual field with respect to either their line of sight, the orientation
of their head, or the orientation of their torso. Intriguingly, many studies have reported cases of
object-based neglect. For example, Tipper and Behrmann (1996) showed patients a horizontal
“dumbbell” figure consisting of two textured circles connected by a straight line and asked them to
detect whether one of the circles was a predefined target. Most subjects had difficulty identifying
the target when it was on the left. In the crucial condition, after appearing on screen, the dumbbell
rotates 180˝ in full view. If one perceives the position of a part of the dumbbell with respect to
the whole object, then whichever circle one perceives to be on the right of the dumbbell prior to
rotation should continue to be perceived as on the right of the dumbbell after rotation, even though
it is now located on the left side of the screen. Tipper and Behrmann found that after rotation,
some patients consistently were able to detect the right part of the dumbbell, even though it was
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now located on the left side of the screen. However, they continued to have difficulty detecting the
left part of the dumbbell, though its final position was on the right side of the screen. This suggests
that the patients were neglecting parts in the left half of the object and not just in the left half of the
visual field. In order to explain this, it seems that we must posit that the same circle is represented
the same way before and after orientation, as left of y, although the orientation of the object, y,
changes through the rotation.
While much of the literature on object-based neglect focuses on the representation of posi-
tions of items within a reference frame, similar points can be made for the perceived orientation
of items within a reference frame (see Robertson, 2004). Take, for example, McCloskey and his
colleagues’ analyses of the difficulties that neurotypical subjects, children, and patients with de-
velopmental deficits have in discriminating objects from their left-right reflected “mirror-images”
(McCloskey et al., 2006, Gregory and McCloskey, 2010, Gregory et al., 2011). Whether two stim-
uli are treated as mirror images depends on what one represents as the left and right parts of those
stimuli, and hence how one perceives the stimuli as oriented. McCloskey and his colleagues find
that we do not just mistake stimuli that are reflected about their own axis, as with “ P” and “ P”
in which the bump is reflected around the stem; we also mistake stimuli that are reflected about an
external axis, such as “ P” and “ P ,” in which the whole figure is left-right reflected with respect
to the orientation of the page. According to their “coordinate-system orientation representation”
hypothesis, “an object’s orientation relative to an extrinsic reference frame is represented by spec-
ifying the relationship between the axes of the object-centered frame and those of the extrinsic
frame” (Gregory and McCloskey, 2010, p. 124).13
Visual search also appears to be sensitive to an item’s orientation relative to an external refer-
ence frame. Treisman and Gormican (1988) demonstrated that an oblique line is especially salient
in a field of vertical lines. An oblique line “pops out” from the vertical lines, phenomenologically
13In fact, these authors argue that the variety of mirror-image confusions requires representations of frame-relative
orientation themselves to be complex: “object-orientation representations are compositional—that is, the representa-
tions are composed of multiple components, each of which represents a different aspect of an object’s orientation,”
including constituents that respectively specify the polarity, direction, and magnitude of the item’s orientation relative
to its extrinsic frame of reference (Gregory and McCloskey, 2010, p. 127). Neander (2017, Ch. 1) discusses these
results, but with a somewhat different purpose.
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Figure 5: An oblique line “pops out” from vertical distractors in an upright frame but not in a frame that is tilted
parallel to the line.
speaking, and one’s ability to detect the oblique line does not diminish substantially with greater
numbers of vertical distractors. Interestingly, this pop-out effect is not symmetrical: a vertical tar-
get does not pop out in a field of oblique distractors. However, that vertical target will pop out if
it is presented in a tilted frame so that it is oblique with respect to the frame and the distractors are
vertical with respect to the frame (Figure 5; May and Zhaoping, 2009, Marendaz, 1998).
4.3.2 Compositional Analysis
An item can be represented as having a given relative orientation in a number of different contexts.
The triangles in Figure 3 are each represented as parallel to their reference frame, though they are
represented as having different reference frames. What remains constant across these two contexts
is the representation of the triangle as oriented parallel to an item y, where y is not specified by the
representation of the triangle’s relative orientation. The difference in the perceived orientations of
the triangles is a result of combining the representation of the triangle’s relative orientation with
the representations of a specific object that serves as the reference item, y, with respect to which
the relative orientation of the triangle determines an absolute orientation in the visual field.
The representation of relative orientation is in a sense an “incomplete” or “unsaturated” rep-
resentation. I will assume that the representation of an item’s relative orientation cannot occur
except in combination with another representation that specifies its reference frame. The same
representation of the triangle as oriented parallel to its reference frame can occur in combination
with different representations of reference frames; but the former cannot occur in the absence of
any separate representation of an extrinsic reference frame’s orientation, shape, or other features.
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When the representation of relative orientation is combined with a representation of another item,
the result is a complex representation in which the value of y in the content of the former represen-
tation is given by (bound to) the object represented by the latter.
Let αθÑ be a representation of an item’s orientation θ as a function of some unspecified refer-
ence frame y. We can give the conditions under which this representation of the triangle is satisfied
by, or perfectly accurate relative to, a reference frame y:
If αθÑ is a representation of x, then it is perfectly accurate relative to y iff x is oriented at an
angle θ˝ to the orientation of y.
This representation cannot be evaluated as accurate or inaccurate full stop, since the reference item
y is not actually given. Rather the representation functions to be combined with another represen-
tation and its content functions to be integrated with the content of that other representation.
Let xαθÑ d βθ1y denote the structural relation between a representation αθÑ of an item’s rel-
ative orientation and a representation βθ1 of another item that serves as its reference frame. Ide-
alizing, and abstracting away other details such as represented position, motion, and so on, the
structural constraint on this mode of combination has something like the following form:
Framing: (6) (a) αθÑ can only occur in combination with another representation, xpαθÑ d βθ1qy.
(b) The binding strength of xpαθÑ d βθ1qy is proportional to how close θ is to a cardi-
nal orientation (0˝, 90˝, 180˝ and 270˝).
The principle of semantic composition for xpαθÑ d βθ1qy sets the reference orientation for αθÑ
to the orientation of the object represented by βθ1 :
Framing: (7) xpαθÑ d βθ1qy is perfectly accurate iff
(a) if βθ1 is a representation of y, then αθÑ is perfectly accurate relative to y (that is,
αθÑ is perfectly accurate if the free variable in its accuracy condition is bound to
the value of y), and
(b) βθ1 is perfectly accurate.14
14These clauses can be revised to accommodate the case in which multiple representations combine under a common
reference frame: xptαiθÑ, . . . ,αnθ1Ñu d βωqy.
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Suppose t0˝Ñ is the representation of the triangle as oriented 0˝ from the orientation of an
unspecified item y and r90˝ is a representation of a rectangle as oriented 90˝. Then t0˝Ñ d r90˝
is perfectly accurate just in case the triangle is oriented 0˝ from the rectangle and the rectangle is
oriented 90˝. The accuracy of this representation therefore depends on two things: the triangle’s
orientation relative to the rectangle and the orientation of the rectangle. The whole representation
might be accurate with respect to the one but inaccurate with respect to the other.
The theory sketched in Section 2 characterizes the constituents of perceptual representations as
semantically uniform in the sense that each has the same type of semantic role: each determines
a complete accuracy condition. By contrast, while the representation of the triangle as oriented
parallel to its extrinsic reference frame does carry content about the triangle, it does not determine
a complete accuracy condition; its content functions to integrate with the content of another rep-
resentation that specifies the reference frame. Perceptual representations of various aspects of a
scene may therefore have different types of semantic values (cf. Fodor, 2008, Shea et al., 2017). In
fact, this analysis entails that constituents of arbitrary complexity can be semantically incomplete.
One can get multiple embeddings of reference frames. For example, if a0˝Ñ, b90˝Ñ, and c30˝ rep-
resent a, b, and c respectively, then the combination pa0˝Ñ d b90˝Ñq d c30˝ is perfectly accurate
just in case a is oriented in the same direction as b, b is oriented 90˝ from c, and c is oriented 30˝
(see Watt, 1990, Baylis and Driver, 1993). The complex constituent, pa0˝Ñ d b90˝Ñq, does not
determine a complete accuracy condition. While it may accurately represent a’s orientation rela-
tive to b, it functions to combine with a representation of an item relative to which b’s orientation
is represented.
4.3.3 Representational Function of Reference Frame Effects
As Marr and Nishihara (1978) noted, there is an ecological rationale for representing position,
orientation, and other spatial features in a compositional, frame-relative fashion. The spatial re-
lationships between parts of an object offer significant cues to the identity and category of the
object, not to mention its functional significance. If one needs to tell a wolf from a fox, the spatial
relationships between the head, torso, limbs, and tail are a dead giveaway, but whether the crea-
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ture’s tail is vertical or horizontal relative to one’s visual field is incidental. If one needs to tell an
aggressive wolf from an ambivalent one, what matters is the orientation of the tail relative to the
wolf’s torso, not its orientation relative to oneself. By representing the positions and orientations
of items relative to the larger objects or configurations of which those items are parts, the visual
system makes these critical relationships explicit.
Representations of frame-relative position and orientation are also more likely to be reliably
accurate than representations that merely attribute absolute orientations to all items. Normally, the
different features in a scene are not positioned entirely independently of each other. The position,
orientation, and motion of an object constrains the positions, orientations, and motions of its parts.
The wolf’s tail is unlikely to be very far separated from the wolf’s head, no matter where the wolf
is in the visual field. As with normalization, representing the positions and orientations of items
relative to the objects or configurations of which they are part regiments the risk of error. Because
the range of different positions and orientations that the wolf’s legs can have relative to its body is
far smaller than the range of different positions and orientations that they can have relative to the
viewer or the entire scene, there is far less risk of inaccuracy in representing the legs relative to the
body than there is in representing their positions and orientations relative to oneself or the whole
scene. Even if one is substantially wrong about where the whole is, one can still be substantially
right about its parts and their relations.15
5 Context and Objectivity
Each of the analyses that I advocated in the previous section locates the source of contextual influ-
ence in a different aspect of the compositional edifice: in the structural relationships between rep-
resentations, in the selection of constituents that will best fit into such relationships, or in semantic
operations over incomplete contents. Even though different context effects require different anal-
yses, they have a common representational function. I argued in each case that the context effects
functioned to facilitate the composition of reliably accurate representations, given an uncertain but
15None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that there is no perceptual representation of the triangle per se as having
an absolute orientation, only that the triangle is at least represented as having a frame-relative orientation.
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structured environment. I suggest that this is a general function of perceptual context effects and
characteristic of the compositional grammar of perception.
To briefly review: (1) Representations of distant, substantially misaligned contour segments
cannot combine into a representation of a whole contour, unless they are also combined with rep-
resentations of connecting segments. This structural principle reflects the environmental regularity
that two distant, disconnected, substantially misaligned edges are extraordinarily unlikely to be
part of the same contour. (2) Representations of contour segments selectively combine with repre-
sentations of contour segments with dissimilar, but aligned orientations. This principle capitalizes
on the regularities that hold among the different parts of a contour in order to reliably represent
the whole contour, as well as the genuinely distinctive features of the different parts of that con-
tour. (3) By representing features of an item relative to an object or configuration that serves as an
extrinsic reference frame, the representation of the whole and its parts can be insulated somewhat
from uncertainty about the rest of the scene. This is because the internal structure of an object
or configuration tends to be more stable than the relations between disparate objects or configura-
tions. The constituent representation of an item’s relative orientation is therefore able to contribute
content about a stable feature of the item to the content of the whole percept.
It is widely recognized that perception capitalizes on systematic patterns in the world in order
to accurately represent items across a variety of settings in which they can appear. The claim here is
that substantive environmental patterns are recapitulated in the compositional grammar of percep-
tion, namely the ways perceptual representations can and cannot combine and the semantic import
of those combinations. The combinability of representations in different contexts of embedding
reflects the varying relationships that the represented features have across different settings. The
semantic contributions of perceptual representations encodes the stable role that the represented
features play in different settings. Insofar as a perceptual state is structurally possible, it is un-
likely to represent something that is highly abnormal in the perceiver’s environment—a contour
the parts of which are randomly scattered across the scene, for example. The structural possibility
of a perceptual state is a guide to its objective plausibility.
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The combinatorial and semantic principles in perception capitalize on objective patterns in the
world. But the world cannot just imprint these principles on the mind through sensory signals. The
retinal image underdetermines which edges belong to the same object, for example. Regularities
about how object contours hang together are not inherent in the surface patterns in the sensory
stimulus. Instead, the mind has to develop, through evolution and learning, its own internal con-
straints on how representations can go together so as to best reflect how aspects of the world go
together (Geisler and Diehl, 2002, Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008). These internal constraints must
be enforced in the constructive parsing of the unstructured image. If the compositional princi-
ples in perception are biased against the composition of wildly inaccurate representations, then
the free combinability and semantic uniformity of representations should be the exception rather
than the rule in perception. In a structured but uncertain world, reliable accuracy requires that
representations not be structurally inert islands. The representation of one feature should not be
“shrink-wrapped” from the representation of other relevant features. Instead, there should be sub-
stantive combinatorial constraints and differentiation in semantic roles that reflect the patterned
relationships between the represented features in the world.
I propose, then, that the context effects discussed here, and perceptual context effects in general,
are the product of what Kemp and Tenenbaum (2008) call “domain-specific constraints on the
structure of mental representations.” The constraints mentioned above function to ensure that the
visual system cannot compose representations of situations that are radically improbable in the
perceiver’s normal environment. By contrast, many other familiar representational schemes do not
have this character. The well-formedness of a logical formula, not to mention a sentence of English,
does not typically provide any guarantee to its truth or plausibility. Even contradictory statements
can be well-formed! These schemes give wide syntactic permission to represent the ridiculous and
even impossible. One explanation for the central role of context effects in perception is that the
compositional principles of perception—the very forms of perceptual representations—aim at the
composition of reliably accurate representations of the perceiver’s normal environment .
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6 Conclusion
A compositional semantics of perception explains how the accuracy conditions of perceptual repre-
sentations derive from the contents of their constituent parts and the way these parts are structurally
related. Such a theory is of broad value for understanding the nature, grounds, and epistemic role
of perceptual content. However, the explanatory power and generality of many existing accounts
of the semantics of perception are unclear. As an illustration, I outlined a basic semantics for a
rarefied set of percepts. This account had two notable features: it characterized perceptual repre-
sentations of the different aspects of a scene as semantically uniform, each determining a complete
accuracy condition, and as combinable without substantive restriction. I pointed to the limitations
of this account, and others like it, when it comes to the sort of “holistic” perceptual phenomena
that has been at the center of research on perceptual organization for over a century. In the first
place, one can represent some sets of items, but not others, as having certain higher-order features.
Associated with the perception of higher-order, emergent features are context effects, in which the
way one aspect of a scene is perceived depends on the way other aspects of the scene are per-
ceived. Perceptual context effects are ubiquitous and central to perception. An adequate semantics
of perception must accommodate these phenomena. However, formulating such a semantics is a
non-trivial task and some have doubted that it is a feasible one.
I argued that characteristic examples of context-sensitivity in perception are driven by an un-
derlying compositional grammar. But this grammar is not one in which perceptual representations
are semantically uniform and freely combinable. Why should perception lack the semantic unifor-
mity and free combinability implicit in the basic semantics with which we began? I suggested that
context effects are closely tied to the objectivity of perception. The grammar of perception func-
tions to ensure the composition of reliably accurate percepts in an uncertain but structured world.
The combinability of representations reflects the normal combinability of the represented features
in the world and the semantic value of a representation reflects the stable role of the represented
feature in the different surroundings in which it occurs. Context effects arise when order is brought
to one’s internal perceptual representations, an order which capitalizes on the natural order in the
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features one perceptually represents.
Compositional semantics offers a framework for understanding the complex ways that mental
states constitutively function to fit together to represent objective features of the world. An ade-
quate understanding of the nature of a given perceptual representation requires an understanding
of its systematic, nuanced relationships to its constituents and to representations of which it is a
constituent. It remains to be seen how far this semantic program can be pushed for perception—
not just for representations in vision, but also for those in and across other modalities. One aim
of this discussion has been to show that the issues involved in working out an adequate semantics
of perception are far richer and more varied than has generally been appreciated. Even setting
foundational questions to the side, the core explanatory challenge of accounting for the diverse
phenomena of perception is daunting. These phenomena regularly resist straightforward semantic
analysis. Still, I think a constructive optimism toward a compositional semantics of perception is
warranted. Despite their different analyses, the phenomena discussed here share a representational
function that is plausibly common throughout perception. The compositional grammar of percep-
tion, context effects and all, constitutes a framework for supporting the objectivity of perception.
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Lauffs, Marc M., Choung, Oh-Hyeon, Ögmen, Haluk, Herzog, Michael H., and Kerzel, Dirk.
(2019). Reference-frames in vision: Contributions of attentional tracking to nonretinotopic
perception in the ternus-pikler display. Journal of Vision 19(12), 7.
Li, Zhaoping. (1999). Contextual influences in v1 as a basis for pop out and asymmetry in visual
search. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96(18), 10530–10535.
Linsley, Drew, Kim, Junkyung, Ashok, Alekh, and Serre, Thomas. (2020). Recurrent neural cir-
cuits for contour detection. In International Conference on Learning Representations.
Marendaz, Christian. (1998). Nature and dynamics of reference frames in visual search for orien-
tation: Implications for early visual processing. Psychological Science 9(1), 27–32.
Marr, David and Nishihara, Herbert Keith. (1978). Representation and recognition of the spatial
organization of three-dimensional shapes. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series
B. Biological Sciences 200(1140), 269–294.
Matthen, Mohan. (2004). Features, places, and things: Reflections on austen clark’s theory of
sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17(4), 497–518.
Matthen, Mohan. (2005). Seeing, Doing, & Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Matthen, Mohan. (2014). Image content. In Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University
Press.
May, Keith A. and Zhaoping, Li. (2009). Effects of surrounding frame on visual search for vertical
or tilted bars. Journal of Vision 9(13), 1–19.
53 of 57
Compositionality and Context in Perception [DRAFT] Lande
McCloskey, Michael, Valtonen, Jussi, and Cohen Sherman, Janet. (2006). Representing orien-
tation: A coordinate-system hypothesis and evidence from developmental deficits. Cognitive
Neuropsychology 23(5), 680–713.
Nanay, Bence. (2020). Perceiving indeterminately. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9(3), 160–
166.
Neander, Karen. (2017). A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Palmer, Stephen E.. (1977). Hierarchical structure in perceptual representation. Cognitive Psy-
chology 9(4), 441–474.
Palmer, Stephen E.. (1980). What makes triangles point: Local and global effects in configurations
of ambiguous triangles. Cognitive Psychology 12(3), 285 – 305.
Palmer, Stephen E.. (1989). Reference frames in the perception of shape and orientation. In
Bryan E. Shepp (Ed.), Object Perception: Structure & Process, Volume Ballesteros, Soledad,
Chapter 5, pp. 121–163. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Palmer, Stephen E. and Beck, Diane M.. (2007). The repetition discrimination task: An objective
method for studying perceptual grouping. Perception & Psychophysics 69(1), 68–78.
Partee, Barbara. (2004). Compositionality. In Compositionality in Formal Semantics, pp. 153–181.
Blackwell.
Partee, Barbara H.. (2007). Compositionality and coercion in semantics: The dynamics of adjective
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